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PUBLIC RECREATION AND THE NAVIGABILITY
TEST: STATE v. McILROY
City dwellers have turned in increasing numbers to the rural
streams in the area surrounding the Ozark Mountains of Arkansas
and Missouri for recreation. ! One of the most popular pastimes is the
float trip by canoe.2 Yet with canoeing, as with all other kinds of
water recreation, a clear understanding of the relative rights of the
riparian land owner3 and the public must exist to avoid confronta-
tions. To decide whether the public has a right to use a watercourse,
courts employ the navigability test. Under the navigability test, the
ability of a watercourse to provide a route for useful transportation
determines the balance of public and private rights with respect to the
watercourse.4 In State v. Mcllroy,5 the Arkansas Supreme Court
1. The Current River is the best known and most popular stream in the Missouri
Ozarks. Of the recreational visitors to the Current during the early and mid 1970's,
55% came from urban areas, primarily St. Louis and Kansas City, while only 1%
came from the local counties through which the stream flows. Use of the stream for
canoe float trips increased from 40,000 floater days in 1968 to over 243,000 in 1977.
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, RIVER RESEARCH AT OZARK NATIONAL SCENIC
RIVERWAYS 1970-1977, at 35, 87-93 (1973) (hereinafter cited as CURRENT RIVER
STUDY).
2. Two lesser known streams in the Missouri Ozarks are representative: the Gas-
conade and the Meramec. According to estimates by the Missouri Department of
Conservation, the Gasconade, a small stream, accommodates 15,700 visits per year
totaling 99,000 hours; on the upper 74 miles of the Meramec, a moderate-sized
stream, there are 98,000 annual visits by canoeists spending 550,000 hours on the
water. Telephone interview with George Fleener, Senior Resident Fisheries Biolo-
gist, Jefferson City, Missouri (Sept. 8, 1980). On the Mulberry River in Arkansas, the
stream in question in the present case, an estimated 600 people per weekend float
through Mcllroy land. Brief for Appellant, State of Arkansas at 7, State v. Mcllroy,
Ark. - 595 S.W.2d 659 (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (1981).
3. A riparian owner is one whose land extends to or includes the banks of a
stream or river. The owner of lake front property is called a littoral owner. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 842, 1192 (5th ed. 1979). Any reference in this comment
to riparian rights or ownership includes those of the littoral owner except where spe-
cifically noted otherwise.
4. What forms of transportation are or should be included in the test is the subject
of this comment.
5. - Ark. _, 595 S.W.2d 659 (1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3247 (1981).
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changed the navigability test by holding that a stream having only
recreational value is open to public use.
In Mcl/roy, a riparian land owner filed suit to enjoin an environ-
mental group and a canoe rental company from using and publiciz-
ing the stream that flowed through his land.6 The State of Arkansas
intervened, claiming that the stream was navigable and that, there-
fore, the state had title to the bed.7 The trial court found the stream
nonnavigable, thereby upholding the riparian's private property in-
terest along with his incidental right to exclude the public from ca-
noeing on that portion of the stream that flowed through his land.8
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. Recalling Barboro v. Boyle9,
an early case that recognized an important public interest in water-
borne recreation, 0 the Mcllroy court held that a stream which is
canoeable for a substantial portion of the year is navigable and,
therefore, open to public recreational use."
Federal courts use the navigability test to determine the extent of
federal power over the nation's waterways. Initially, in cases involv-
ing questions of admiralty jurisdiction, Ithe United States Supreme
Court adopted the English common law approach, which considered
rivers navigable only if tides affected the river level.' 3 This restrictive
test of navigability inadequately defined the limits of federal jurisdic-
tion under the commerce clause,'4 especially for a country with vast,
commercially useful inland waterways.' 5 As a result, the Court rede-
6. - Ark. at_, 595 S.W.2d at 660. Due to the efforts of an environmental group,
The Ozark Society, and a canoe rental company, Wayfarer Expeditions, people from
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri and Texas have learned about and floated the
Mulberry. Brief for Appellant, supra note 2, at 7.
7. - Ark. _, 595 S.W.2d at 660.
8. Id.
9. 119 Ark. 377, 178 S.W. 378 (1915).
10. Id. at 382-83, 178 S.W. at 380. Quotedin State v. McIlroy, - Ark. at ., 595
S.W.2d at 664. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra.
11. - Ark. - _, 595 S.W.2d 663, 665.
12. The Constitution gives the federal courts the power to try all cases of maritime
or admiralty jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
13. E.g., The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
14. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824), the U.S. Supreme Court held that commerce comprehends navigation and
that the federal power to regulate commerce therefore includes the power to regulate
navigation. See generally Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights
in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. Rnv. 391, 398-408 (1970).
15. Carson v. Blazir, 2 Binn. 475, 484 (Pa. 1810). The tidal theory meant that the
[Vol. 21:287
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol21/iss1/10
NAVIGABILITY TEST
fined navigability by expanding the test to include all waters that
were navigable in fact for commercially valuable transportation. 16
The Court did not consider recreation a commercially valuable pur-
suit. 7 Under the federal test, therefore, the ability of a watercourse
to accommodate recreation will not support a finding of navigability
where the watercourse lacks commercial usefulness.
The navigability of a watercourse determines its public or private
status.18 The states, upon joining the Union, received title to the beds
of their commercially navigable waters as an incident of the transfer
of local sovereignty. 9 These beds passed to the states subject to a
preemptory public trust for navigation; regardless of the private or
public status of the riparian property, the federal government re-
tained ultimate control under the commerce clause.2° Thus, in Don-
nelly v. United States,2 the Supreme Court held that a state, in
accordance with local property law, may assign its bed title to the
riparian owner, but the assignment does not defeat the public trust.22
In its role as public trustee, a state may allow whatever public use of
Delaware River was "navigable" from Trenton, N.J. southward only, although ves-
sels could navigate the river for commercial purposes well inland of Trenton. Id
16. The Propeller Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The
Supreme Court gave the basic definition of "commercial navigability in fact" in The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). A waterway is "navigable in fact" if it
affords, in its natural condition, a highway for commerce. The Court has expanded
the basic definition through the years to include man-made waterways, Ex Parte
Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); waters that were originally navigable but are no longer so,
Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); and waters that
could be navigable if reasonable improvements were made, even though those im-
provements are not completed or authorized, United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). For the development of the federal navigability standard,
see Guim, An Analysis of Navigable Waters f the United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REV.
559 (1966).
17. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,442 (1874) (Not every small creek acces-
sible by a fishing skiff or gunning canoe is navigable. The stream must be useful for
transportation in trade or agriculture.).
18. See note 34 and accompanying text infra.
19. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934). The original thirteen colonies
received their titles from the English Crown. Upon entering the Union they retained
those titles. The states subsequently admitted received the same title rights in order
that they might stand on an "equal footing." Shively v. Bowlbey, 152 U.S. 1, 11-18,
26-28, 57-58 (1893). See generally Leighty, supra note 14, at 408-23.
20. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). See note 40 infra.
21. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
22. Id. at 262. See Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFFALO L.
REV. 427, 432 (1961).
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its waterways it deems appropriate, including recreation?. 3 A ripa-
rian on a navigable stream may not exclude the public from using it
even if he holds title to the bed.
24
The status of bed title to commercially nonnavigable waters
presents a more complicated issue. All federal riparian patents to
private parties granted before statehood include title to the stream, or
lake bed,' unless Congress specifically reserved those waters to pub-
lic use.26 The Supreme Court held in Hardin v. Jordan27 that state
law controls federal grants of riparian land occurring after state-
hood.28 If the state has adopted a navigability test as strict as the
federal test, courts shall construe federal grants to private riparians to
include bed title.29 Some states, however, have a more liberal navi-
gability test; federal grants in these states may include a waterway
considered unnavigable under the federal standard but navigable
under the state standard. In such cases, the United States retains title
23. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, has declared that the public right
to fish, hunt, and boat for pleasure is an incident of navigability. Nekoosa Edwards
Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W. 144 (1929), rehearing denied,
229 N.W. 631 (1930), af'd, 283 U.S. 787 (1931) (pleasure boating); Willow River Club
v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898) (fishing) Waite, Public Rights to Use and
Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 335, 339. See also I WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.2(c) (1967).
24. The owner holds title subject to the same easement of navigation that would
apply to the state if the state had retained title. E.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Newport
Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 123-24, 336 N.E. 2d 453, 454 (1975). See note 20
and accompanying text supra.
25. E.g., Oklahoma v. Texas 258 U.S. 574, 584 (1922). See also 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 37.2(c).
26. The Missouri Supreme Court found just such a reservation in the federal stat-
ute providing for the territorial government of Missouri. The statute proclaimed the
Missouri and the Mississippi Rivers and "all the carrying places between the same"
public highways. Act of June 4, 1812, § 15, 2 STAT. 747 (1850). In addition the act
admitting Missouri to the Union declared the Mississippi and "waters leading to the
same" common highways. Act of March 6, 1820, § 2, 3 STAT. 546 (1846). In Elder v.
Delcour 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954), the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the Meramec, although not navigable under the federal test, was a carrying place and
a water leading to the Mississippi within the meaning of Congress, and therefore a
public highway open to recreation.
27. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
28. Id. at 380.
29. In Hardin the plaintiff sued to recover a portion of the bed of a small Illinois
lake. The plaintiff based its claim on a federal grant made to its ancestor in 1841,
twenty-three years after statehood. The court found that under Illinois law the lake
was not navigable and that in Illinois riparian grants on nonnavigable waters in-
cluded bed title. Accordingly it held for the plaintiff. Id. at 372, 379-88.
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to the bed rather than conveying it to the private riparian or to the
state.30 Thus, in all cases involving a federal grant, any state claim to
bed title raises a federal question in which the federal test of commer-
cial navigability preempts state law." Only when a private riparian
holds his grant from the state, may the state claim bed title based on a
navigability test more liberal than the federal test.32
Some states have found the federal navigability test too narrow to
encompass the interests of their citizens. In the seminal case of Lam-
prey v. State,33 the Minnesota court reasoned that since navigability
determines whether a watercourse is public or private, a water-
course's ability to provide public benefit should determine its naviga-
bility.34 The court rejected the commercial restriction of the federal
test because the test did not include those recreational uses to which
Minnesota's waters were especially well suited.35 It extended the
state navigability test to include any watercourse that could accom-
modate recreational boating.36
The Lamprey court based its authority to allow public recreational
30. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934). The use of state law in construing
a conveyance by the United States determines if bed title impliedly passes to the
grantee as an incident of the abutting upland expressly granted. If state law deter-
mines that bed title does not pass, the state derives no claim to it because the state is
not a party to the grant. Id. at 28. A state may not claim title to the bed which
remains the property of the United States by declaring the water over it navigable.
Id. at 29.
31. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926). This case deals
specifically with pre-statehood grants, but its logic viewed in the light of United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934), clearly extends to post-statehood grants.
32. Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922) (state
may not divest riparian of bed title by retroactive rule for determining navigability).
Such state action would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution as a deprivation of property without just compensation. See Lauer, The Ra-
rit Rigt as Property, UNIVEsrrY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, WATER RESOURCES
AND THE LAW 131, 163-64 (1958).
33. 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
34. Id. at 199, 53 N.W. at 1143. The court goes on to say that the navigable-
nonnavigabl nomenclature should be dropped in favor of public-private waters. Id.
at 200, 53 N.W. at 1143-44. This approach would avoid the pecuniary commercial
connotation which attaches to the concept of navigability. Some states ignore the
navigability concept, using public benefit to determine which waters are public. E.g.,
Lunt v. Hunter, 16 Maine 9 (1839) (all waters public for fishing even though nonnavi-
gable); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (navigability determines bed
title, but does not affect public's right to lawful recreation on or in the state's waters).
35. 52 Minn. at 199, 53 N.W. at 1143.
36. Id. at 200, 53 N.W. at 1144.
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use of the state's waterways upon a theory that the state owned the
underlying beds.37 The court construed Hardin v. Jordan38 to hold
that bed title to all water navigable under state law passed to the
state.39 The United States Supreme Court subsequently made it clear
that in bed title disputes, navigability is primarily a federal issue to
which state courts must apply the federal test.4" In State v. Adams,4
the Minnesota court admitted the error of its Lamprey decision in
claiming title to the beds of recreationally but not commercially valu-
able waters.42
Once the riparian establishes his ownership in the bed of a water-
37. Id.
38. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
39. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. at 192,53 N.W. at 1140-41. See Hardin v. Jordan,
140 U.S. at 380 (the question of bed title must be decided by the local state law).
40. Considering the Supreme Court's language in deciding cases like Hardin '.
Jordan, it is not surprising that state courts were confused about the role of state law
in such disputes. E.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 262 (1913) ("what
shall be deemed navigable water within the meaning of the local rules of property is
for the determination of the several states"); see notes 21-22 and accompanying text
supra and notes 69-72 and accompanying text infra. In 1922 the Court recognized
that a state may retain bed title to federally nonnavigable waters involved in riparian
grants by the state by imposing a more liberal definition of navigability. The state
may not, however, alter property rights vested under a pre-statehood, federal grant.
In the latter case, navigability vel non is a federal question. Brewer-Elliot Oil and
Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. at 89. See note 32 supra. As late as 1934, Oregon,
citing Hardin v. Jordan, claimed bed title to certain waters by declaring that they were
navigable under state law. The Supreme Court decided that while state law could be
used to construe the federal government's intention with respect to federal riparian
grants made after statehood, state law could not be used to divest the United States of
its title. Where waters are not navigable under the federal test, a state finding of
navigability means solely that bed title does not pass either to the private grantee or to
the state-but remains in the United States. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 24-
29 (1935); Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Steams, 24 Mi NN. L. REv. 305,
311-18 (1940). See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
41. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1958) cert. denied 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
42. Id. at 554-58, 89 N.W.2d at 683-86. The Adams court points out that the
language of Hardin v. Jordan is unclear on the point, causing confusion in state
courts. The Lamprey decision was a result of that confusion in the Minnesota court.
Id. at 557, 89 N.W.2d at 685. The Adams court does not resolve the question of
recreational water rights. Instead, it answers the fears expressed in amicus curiae
briefs concerning the future of water recreation by stating that the litigation did not
involve that subject. The question before the court was one of bed ownership, not the
state's right to protect and control the state's waters. Id. at 560-61, 89 N.W.2d at 687-
88. The court leaves the door open for the state to continue to allow recreation on
nonnavigable waters, but on grounds other than state ownership of the beds. See
notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
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course,43 the question becomes what fights does he have in the water
itself. In the older view, derived from English common law," his
property right extended upward to include the water over the bed.4"
Just as the riparian could exclude the public from his fields, so could
he exclude the public from the surface of the water over his land.46
The more modem view considers his interest in the water, as opposed
to the bed, usufructory rather than possessive.47 The riparian has the
right to reasonable use of the water for domestic and commercial
purposes provided he allows his fellow riparians to enjoy similar
usage. 48
43. A riparian whose upland extends along one bank of a stream owns the bed to
the thread or middle of the stream. If his land encompasses both banks, he has title to
the entire bed. The same is true for lakes except where the shore is rounded. In that
case the littoral landowner's property extends in a pie-shaped wedge to the center of
the lake. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12-27a (A. Casner ed, 1952).
44. See I COKE ON LITTELTON, ch. 1 § (4a); Knuth, Basesfor the Legal Establish-
ment of a Public Right of Recreation in Utah's "'Non-Navigable" Waters, 5 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 95, 96 (1978).
45. According to the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum (whoever
owns the soil owns up to the sky), the water over a privately-owned bed is the prop-
erty of the riparian just as the trees and stones on his upland belong to him. J. AN-
GELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES 7-10 (1877); e.g., GA. CODE § 85-
1301 ("Running Water, while on land, belongs to the owner of the land...").
46. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Introductory Notes §§ 850-57 at 349 (1939). Any
unprivileged entry on a privately-owned stream bed or on the surface of the water
over it constitutes trespass. Id.
47. Water, especially flowing water, differs from other inanimate objects because
of its inherent instability; in that sense it resembles animalsferae naturae. The major-
ity view holds that water, like wild animals, can be owned when reduced to posses-
sion, but in its natural state allows for only a right of use. I WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS § 16.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Casner, supra note 43 at § 12-33; Leighty, supra
note 14 at 161, 232-33; e.g., Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 125 P. 812 (1912)
(ownership of the bed does not confer ownership to the water above it); Higgins v.
Board of Supervisors, 188 Iowa 448, 176 N.W. 268 (1920) (no vested interest in waters
of lake from ownership of abutting lands); State v. Beardsley, 108 Iowa 396 (1899)
(owner of soil does not own the stream).
48. The riparian's obligation to use the water flowing past his land reasonably is
part of the riparian doctrine. This doctrine seeks to insure equitable allocation of the
water resource among the riparians along a stream or lake. An unreasonable use of
water by an upper riparian, e.g., pollution or excessive diversion of the water, is an
actionable tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 850, 850 A (1977); 1 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 16 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Leighty, supra note 14 at 171-75. The
rights of the riparian are generally the same in those western states termed "prior
appropriation" states as in "riparian" states. In prior appropriation states, however, a
non-riparian may acquire the right to use the water by having appropriated it for a
certain length of time. Unlike the riparian's right of use, the prior appropriator's right
ends with non-use. 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 400-401.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
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Adopting the modem view, some states have augmented the fed-
eral test, which determines bed title, with a more liberal state naviga-
bility test to determine the rights of public recreational use.49 Some
courts justify these tests by claiming state ownership rights in the
water itself.50 Other courts speak in terms of a public trust in streams
See Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930) (riparian rights include use of
the water for general purposes such as bathing and domestic use).
It should be noted that riparian rights, other than exclusive use of the water's sur-
face, do not depend on bed ownership. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100
N.W.2d 689 (1960) (whether waters are navigable has no material bearing on riparian
rights since such rights do not arise from the ownership of the lake bed but as an
incident of the ownership of the shore). Arkansas recognizes that the rights of ripari-
ans on navigable waters are similar to those of iparians on nonnavigable water-
courses. They include: the right of access to the water; the right to wharf out to the
line of navigability; the right to accretions; and the right to reasonable use of the
water as it flows past the land. Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, 222-23, 161
S.W.2d 957 (1942).
49. The following states have extended the navigability test to include recrea-
tional uses: California, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South
Dakota and Wisconsin. People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3rd 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448
(1971) (waters capable of being navigated by oar or motor-propelled small craft are
navigable); Toy v. Atlantic Gulf& Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197,4 A.2d 757 (1939) (water-
ways that permit passage by rowboats and small launches are navigable); Fairchild v.
Kraemer, I 1 A.D.2d 232, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1960) (use of stream for pleasure boating
is a consideration in determining its navigability); Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181
N.W. 622 (1921) (water's usefulness for pleasure, public convenience and enjoyment
may suffice for a finding of navigability); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor
Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959) (the capacity of a water course
for recreational boating may be a factor in determining navigability.); Luscher v.
Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936) (commercial navigability includes recrea-
tion); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937) (the term navigable
extended to include such public purposes as recreation); Muench v. Public Service
Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952) (any stream is navigable in fact if it is
possible to float a skiff or canoe of the shallowest draft.).
50. E.g., Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 90 Or. 13, 175 P. 437 (1918). The Ore-
gon court held that streams that could not support the commerce required by the
federal navigability test, but that were amenable to recreation, possessed a qualified
navigability. Id. at 27, 175 P. at 442. Although the bed title to a qualifiedly navigable
stream remains in the riparian owner, he does not own the water. The riparian's
property interest in the stream is not great enough to defeat the public interest in the
use of the surface for recreation. Id. at 27-28, 175 P. at 442.
In Iowa the legislature had declared that water in any watercourse or other natural
body of water is public and public wealth of the people of the state. The control,
development, and use of water for all beneficial purposes resides in the state. IOWA
CODE § 455.A.2 (1966). Whether the Iowa courts will use the statute to extend navi-
gability for recreation remains an open question. Note, Fishing and Recreational
Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams, 53 IowA L. REv. 1322, 1336-37 (1968).
In Wyoming, the state possesses title to the state's waters regardless of bed owner-
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and lakes suitable for recreation." They essentially hold that the ri-
parian's title and usufructary rights must yield to a public recrea-
tional easement. Whatever theory the courts use,52 the effect remains
the same: they remove the riparian's right to exclude non-riparians
from enjoying "his" portion of the watercourse from his bundle of
property rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided whether
depriving the riparian of exclusive use of the water over his stream
bed amounts to an unconstitutional taking.53
ship. WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1; WYO. STAT. §§ 1-409 to 1-1064 (1957). By virtue of its
title to the water, the state has an easement for a right of way over the natural chan-
nels. WYo. STAT. §§ 41-527, 41-528 (1957). In Day v. Armstrong, the Wyoming
Supreme Court used the state's statutory interest in the waters to circumvent the limi-
tations of commercial navigability. It held that the public had a right to recreational
boating on the state's watercourses regardless of navigability. Day v. Armstrong, 362
P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961). Although statutes like Iowa's and Wyoming's offer a
means of creating public recreational rights on federally nonnavigable waters, judicial
definitions of navigability are determinative in the vast majority of states.
51. Eg., Kelley ex rel. MacMullen v. Hallden 51 Mich. App. 176, 214 N.W.2d
856 (1974). The Kelley court, noting the demise of the timber industry and the rise of
the tourist industry in Michigan, rejected the old "saw log" test of navigability in
favor of a recreational use test. Id. at 187-88, 214 N.W.2d at 862. Under the saw log
test a stream was navigable if it could float a raft of logs to the mill. Id. at 182, 214
N.W.2d at 859. The Kelley court held that the bed title of a riparian on a now recrea-
tionally navigable stream was subject to a perpetual trust to secure to the public its
rights of fishing and navigation. Id. at 185, 214 N.W.2d at 860. This decision is
presumably the court's reaction to unsuccessful efforts in the Michigan legislature to
bypass the navigability doctrine in favor of a public ownership of water approach.
See R. Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect and Prospect, 16 WAYNE L.
REV. 409, 452-56 (1970).
52. Other possible theories are custom and long use and the employment of the
state's police power to open nonnavigable waters to public use. E.g., State Game and
Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co. 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 19 (1940) (alternate holding)
(long and customary use justified recreation on nonnavigable water by all who can
gain access without trespass); Comment, Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private"
Waters, 52 CAL. L. REv. 171, 182-83 (1964); see also 53 IowA L. REv. supra note 50,
at 1337-40. For a discussion of the possible use of the state's police power see Note,
The State v. the Riparian: 4 Problem of Water Use and Control, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q.
257, 269-71.
53. But see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). In Kaiser the
Court dealt with an analogous situation. There a littoral owner with bed title created
a marina out of an Hawaiian fish pond. He had dredged it and opened it into a
navigable bay. Id. at 165-66. Although the court admitted that the marina now qual-
ified as navigable water under the federal test, it held that the government could not
deprive the owner of his right to exclude the public without paying just compensation.
Id. at 179-80. The Court relied on two factors that make this case unique and would
hinder its general application: The littoral owner had created the navigability himself
and had a large financial stake in the marina's exclusivenesss. Id. at 176. In addition,
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The development of the navigability test in Arkansas parallels that
of the federal test. At first the Arkansas court applied the English
tidal test.54 In 1882 the supreme court introduced the commercially
navigable in fact criterion.5 5 It held that to be navigable, a stream
must have the ability to transport the products of the adjoining fields
and forests. 6
In adhering to the federal navigability standard, Arkansas never
imposed restrictions on the riparian's bed title or his ownership rights
in the water over the bed 7.5  Arkansas law held the state had title to
the beds of navigable watercourses while the riparian held title to the
beds of nonnavigable ones.5 1 State law recognized that bed owner-
ship gave the private riparian the right to exclude the public from
using the surface of the water.5 9
The court in Barboro v. Boyle, citing extensively from Lamprey,
emphasized the public recreational benefits that accrue from a find-
Hawaiian property law had treated the fish pond as fast (ie., solid or dry) land, not
aquatic property. Id. at 179. Indeed, the court admits that the facts of the case make
it quite atypical. Id. at 176. Cf. State v. McIlroy, - Ark. at_, 595 S.W.2d at 668-69
(1980) (dissenting opinion).
It may be that not all riparian rights, among them that of exclusive use, are entitled
to constitutional protection absent some special circumstance. Where a change in
state law does not affect bed title but only exclusive use, the Supreme Court may be
unwilling to reverse, except perhaps in a most flagrant instance. Lauer, supra note 32,
at 166, 257.
54. Warren v. Chambers, 25 Ark. 120 (1867) (navigability determined by the ef-
fect of the ebb and flow of the tide).
55. Little Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. v. Brooks, 39 Ark. 403 (1882) (navigability of a
stream determined by its usefulness for commercial transportation).
56. Id. at 409.
57. Medlock v. Galbreath, 208 Ark. 681, 187 S.W.2d 545 (1944). In Medlock the
court employed the maxim cujus est solum, e/is est usque ad coelum. Id. at 683, 187
S.W.2d at 546; see note 45 supra. The court declared that ownership of the bed in fee
included ownership of the water over the bed. Any use of the surface by another for
boating constituted an infringement of the riparian's vested property rights. Id. In
the case at hand, however, other littoral owners could fish on the one owner's water
because Arkansas law allowed strangers to hunt wild game on unenclosed land. Id.
at 684, 187 S.W.2d at 547. The owner may enclose the surface of this water by means
of booms to exclude fellow littoral owners. Id Contra, Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn.
159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960) (each littoral owner on a lake suitable for recreation has
the right to use the entire surface).
58. E.g., McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. 180, 184, 179 S.W.2d 661, 663 (1944)
(citing Barboro v. Boyle, 119 Ark. at 380, 178 S.W. at 380).
59. See note 57 supra.
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ing of navigability.' Unlike the Lamprey court, which promulgated
a new state test in order to make waters having only recreational
value public, the Barboro court limited itself to a liberal interpreta-
tion of the federal, commercial test.6" Indeed, the court later ex-
pressly rejected the notion that a watercourse's suitability for
recreation sufficed to render it navigable.62 Consistent with these
limitations, as late as 1973 Barboro stood merely for the proposition
that water commerce need not succeed financially to come within the
navigability criteria.63
In State v. McI/roy the Arkansas Supreme Court admitted that
heretofore the state had followed the federal test of commercial navi-
gability.' It also recognized that the stream in question lacked com-
mercial value in the traditional sense.65 The Mclroy court saw in
Barboro, however, a prophetic anticipation of the importance of
water recreation to the public interest. 6 It considered decisions of
other states that recognized recreational navigability.67 Further, it
60. 119 Ark. at 382-83, 178 S.W. at 380. The riparian owner on a navigable wa-
terway in Arkansas may not prevent the public from using the water or the bank up to
the high water mark for purposes of bathing, hunting, fishing or boating. Anderson v.
Reams, 204 Ark. 216, 223, 161 S.W.2d 957, 960 (1942). These incidents of navigabil-
ity arise from the state's ownership of the beds of navigable waters. See St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 53 Ark. 314, 13 S.W. 931 (1890) (the state owns the beds
of all navigable rivers in trust for the use of the public); see note 22 and accompany-
ing text supra.
61. Although the lake in question had not been used, except at irregular intervals,
for commercial transportation, testimony showed that it was susceptible to that use.
119 Ark. at 382, 178 S.W. at 380.
62. McGahhey v. McCollum, 207 Ark. at 185, 179 S.W.2d at 664. The fact that a
lake is sufficient for pleasure boating or to float fishing skiffs and canoes did not
render it navigable. Id.
63. Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 682,496 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1973) (lake which had
once supported small car ferry found navigable).
64. - Ark. at _ 595 S.W.2d at 663.
65. Id. at _, 595 S.W.2d at 661. The court describes the Mulberry as an "inter-
mediate stream," smaller than other commercially utilized rivers. Canoes and flat-
bottomed boats can use the Mulberry for six months out of the year. Id.
66. Id. at _ 595 S.W.2d at 664. The Barboro court had speculated about the
potential increased usage of Arkansas waters for such pursuits as pleasure boating,
bathing and fishing. 119 Ark. at 383, 178 S.W. at 380.
67. Among the cases cited are: Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich.
App. 176, 214 N.W.2d 856 (1974), see note 51 supra; People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d
1040,97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625,56 P.2d 1158 (1936),
see note 49 supra; and Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893), see
notes 33-42 and accompanying text supra.
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saw in Donnelly v. United States68 a justification for imposing a lib-
eral state test in the absence of such federal questions as admiralty
jurisdiction and regulation of interstate commerce.69 Implicitly hold-
ing that the public interest in recreation outweighed the riparian's
interest in exclusive use, the court adopted a recreational standard of
navigability."
The McIlroy court fails to explain how the new state test will affect
the bed title of federally nonnavigable, but recreationally useful
streams.7 If it finds that Donnelly sanctions the use of state law to
assume title to the beds of these streams,72 it makes the same mistake
the Lamprey court made in misconstruing Hardin v. Jordan. There
the Minnesota court failed to recognize that the federal test must gov-
ern bed title disputes. 73 Since divestiture of the riparian's bed title
would be an unconstitutional taking, one must assume that the McIl-
roy decision does not affect bed title.
The court makes no mention, however, of the theory upon which it
is basing its right to create new public watercourses. It imposes no
public recreational trust by virtue of state ownership or control of the
water over the stream bed.74 Considering previous Arkansas law,
which accorded the riparian on a commercially nonnavigable stream
absolute ownership and control of the water over his portion of the
bed,75 the court's statement that times have changed and that the
68. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
69. - Ark. at -, 595 S.W.2d at 663.
70. Id. at .. _, 595 S.W.2d at 663.
71. - Ark. at ., 595 S.W.2d at 663.
72. According to Donnelly, state law applies when determining bed title to navIga-
ble waters. 238 U.S. at 261. Hence California by declaring a federally navigable
river nonnavigable under California law, could pass its bed title to the riparian owner.
Id., see notes 23-24 supra. The Mcl/roy court interprets Donnelly as holding that
federal navigability applies only where the bed title dispute is between a state and the
federal government. - Ark. at , 595 S.W.2d at 663. The court misconstrues Don-
nelly if it believes that navigability ve! non is not a federal question in determining
bed title disputes between the state and the private riparian. See note 40 and accom-
panying text supra.
73. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
74. The court must have been aware of the possible theories since it mentions that
Ohio had applied a "public trust" on a river to insure the public right of recreation.
- Ark. at_, 595 S.W.2d at 664, citing State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co.,
44 Ohio App. 2d 121, 336 N.E.2d 453 (1975).
75. See note 57 supra.
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mounting public interest in recreation should be served,7 6 without
some theoretical undergirding, lacks persuasive force. The court's
justification affords little comfort to the riparian who learns that the
stream flowing through his land has become public property."
As the McIlroy court points out, a determination of navigability
translates into a declaration of public rights in a waterway.78 In the
formulation of the navigability test, the court had heretofore held
that commercial benefits justified public access, but that recreational
benefits like sport and esthetic enjoyment did not.79 This dichotomy
seems unwise in view of today's need for recreational outlets.
Though laudably motivated, the Arkansas court's attempt to re-
dress this historical imbalance would deprive, without just compensa-
tion, the riparian of a property right previously accorded." The
76. The Court said that Arkansas had been primarily concerned with steamboat
and barge traffic when the courts developed the previous state navigability test. -
Ark. at - 595 S.W.2d at 664. While recreation has become much more important
since the steamboat era, Arkansas courts after Barboro showed little concern for the
benefits of water recreation when dealing with navigability. See Comment, The Vital-
ity of the Navigability Criterion in the Era of Environmentallsm, 25 ARK. L. REv. 250,
267 (1971). They allowed the riparian to gain a vested interest in the exclusive use of
his nonnavigable water. On the other hand, Michigan, when it changed from its
anachronistic saw log test to the modern recreational use test, took nothing from the
majority of its riparians. Under the old test, a nonnavigable stream under the federal
test could have a limited navigability to float logs. If so, the public could use it for
recreational purposes. Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, 182,
214 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1974); see note 51 supra.
77. One Arkansas writer dealt with the riparian's expectations if someone should
challenge his right to exclusive use of his commercially nonnavigable water. He spec-
ulated that:
[Wlhen the Arkansas court is faced with the problem of rights of private property
owners versus the opening of streams for pleasure, recreation and attraction to
tourists,. . . the case law already in force in this state will compel it to respect
the landowner's exclusive right. . . and restrict the rights of the public to those
waters that are navigable in fact.
Note, Real Provert,--Right to float-Fish through Another's Land, 10 ARK. L. REv.
145, 149 (1955).
78. - Ark. at _ 595 S.W.2d at 663.
79. Under the American impetus to reduce everything capable of ownership to an
object of private property, the courts ignored the interests of the public while develop-
ing the riparian doctrine. Lauer, supra note 32, at 163. In 1882 the Arkansas court
said that the true criterion of navigability is "the dictate of sound business common
sense." Little Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 39 Ark. 403, 409 (1882).
80. As Justice Brandeis once said, "An essential element of individual property is
the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it." Int'l News Serv. v. Asso. Press, 248
U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting opinion).
Prior to McIlroy, one commentator wrote that the seed of broad public rights in
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proper forum to implement new public policy is the legislature. s'
Should the legislature perceive the need for increased recreational
opportunity, a democratically effectuated rather than judicially im-
posed solution would result. Furthermore, the legislature could,
under its police power, regulate the exercise of this newly created
public right. One can expect that the legislature would balance pub-
lic and private interests to ensure that public recreational use will be
reasonable, 2 just as the current law requires reasonable use by the
riparian.83
James X Douglas
Barboro v. Boyle should be nurtured carefully and slowly. If the court recognized
those rights at one stroke, it would arouse cries of violation of due process. 25 ARK.
L. REv., supra note 76, at 285. Indeed the dissenting justice in McIlroy voices just
those concerns. He argues that the navigability test is a rule of property; to liberalize
it would continue confiscation of private property. State v. Mcllroy, - Ark. at ,
595 S.W.2d at 667-69. Although he speaks in terms of title, his remarks also apply to
the right of exclusive use, especially since Arkansas never had a doctrine like limited
navigability. See note 76 supra.
81. The dissenting justice in Mcllroy makes the point that the court should not
submit to public clamor. - Ark. at _., 595 S.W.2d at 668. Rather, the legislature is
the governmental branch whose duty it is to express the public will. Like the court,
the legislature is forbidden by both the state and federal constitutions from taking
private property without compensation. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, ARK.
CONsT. art. 2, §§ 22 & 23. The Mcilroy decision itself is necessarily, if only implic-
itly, dispositive on the state constitutional question. How the U.S. Supreme Court
would view an expansion of public rights of recreational usage is unclear. See note 53
supra.
82. Under the reasonable use doctrine, recreation is a lawful use of the water
abutting the riparian's land. He may pursue recreational use so long as he does not
infringe on the rights of his fellow riparians. See Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 445,
283 S.W.2d 129, 132 (1955). It would seem equitable to require a like reasonableness
from the public vis a vis the riparian. In freeing the public to exercise, without restric-
tion, the recreational incidents of navigability in the small streams of Arkansas, the
McIlroy court may be allowing serious property and ecological damage. The delete-
rious effects of ever increasing canoe traffic on the Current River in the Missouri
Ozarks has forced the National Park Service to contemplate strict recreational use
controls. CuPRRENT RIVER STUDY, supra note 1, at 136.
83. See note 48 supra.
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